Monday, October 29, 2012

NEVIS Review No 3 Section II : Ref # 3.2


NEVIS Review No 3
 Section II 
Ref # 3.2


Beyond Derailment and Canonization: Assessing Meles’s Rule
by Messay Kebede (PhD)

Scholars loyal to the Woyanne regime, often for the sake of ethnic solidarity, but with some scruples left for the objectivity of scholarly studies engage in a risky project when they undertake the assessment of Meles’s rule of Ethiopia. While their main intention is to bring out and defend what they consider to be undeniable achievements, their scholarly bent prevents them from simply overlooking or painting in rosy terms his obvious shortcomings and failures. So they adopt an approach that presents the good and the bad sides of Meles with the hope that the positive aspect will significantly outweigh the negative one. Unfortunately for them, even their modicum objectivity ends up by sneaking drawbacks so toxic that the general picture becomes that of a colossal fiasco.
A case in point is Medhane Tadesse’s paper titled “Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian State,” recently posted, to my surprise, on Aiga website. The paper is a commendable attempt at an objective assessment of Meles’s accomplishments
­. Medhane first explains the rise of Meles through the defeat of all his opponents, which rise he attributes to his personal qualities, such as quick intelligence, communication skills, impressive erudition, and remarkable aptitudes in political maneuvering. In view of these qualities, his rivals, who often had impressive military records, could do little to stop his rise to absolute power, which became effective in 2001 when he defeated an influential splinter group within the TPLF.
Medhane does not hesitate to say that Meles’s victory was a “serious blow to democratic centralism and collective leadership” and that the consolidation of his absolute power was done at the expense of the TPLF as a ruling party. He rightly argues that Meles marginalized the TPLF by centralizing all power, notably by uniting state power and party leadership in his person, thereby creating a power base independent of the TPLF. Clearly, the assessment is moving decisively toward a critical appraisal of Meles’s rule, and so is in line with the view of the splinter group ascribing the numerous problems that Ethiopia faces today to the missteps of a dictatorial deviation.
With great pain, Medhane manages to find the positive side in the alleged economic success of Meles’s policy. Even so, his assessment falls short of being affirmative: he does speak of the theory of developmental state as a promising orientation, but nowhere indicates that it produced notable results. Instead, his skepticism transpires when he writes: Meles “attempted to reorient Ethiopia’s political economy by carrying out far-reaching reforms, and in particular introducing the fundamentals, for what it’s worth, of an Ethiopian version of a developmental state.” Not only do we not feel any enthusiasm for the “far-reaching reforms,” but also the whole economic orientation of the country is greeted with a marked skeptical tone.
By contrast, Medhane underlines the democratic shortcomings of Meles’s regime and its “wholesale offensive against any form of independent centers of power such as free media, free organization, free business, persecution of critical journalists and enactment of repressive laws.” Thus, if on top of stifling democratic changes in the county, Meles did not score any appreciable gains in the economic field, what is left to say except that his 20 years rule was a total failure? Hence my puzzlement as to the reason why the pro-Meles Aiga website posted the article. Is it because Aiga people did not understand the content of the article? Or is it the beginning of a critical look at Meles’s alleged achievements, especially now that it becomes clear that he left the TPLF in disarray?
But no sooner did I hope for such an evolution than I noticed that the article was removed from the website. Instead, a new paper of 20 pages criticizing the analysis of Medhane was posted, as though Aiga was correcting its mistake and forcefully reaffirming its pro-Meles stand. Written by Habtamu Alebachew and titled “Tadese Madhane and his ‘Post-Meles Reform Agenda’: Quest for Logic and Relevance,” the paper reasserts the customary position of Meles’s supporters. The paper rambles through 20 pages about political reforms and the developmental state with the clear purpose of metamorphosing preconceived ideological positions into serious theoretical insights. It denounces contradictions in Medhane’s article and is completely devoid of any critical appraisal of Meles.
It is really not necessary to go into Habtamu’s arguments because they provide nothing more than a smoke screen destined to confuse readers by tired rhetoric and laudatory exaggerations. To give you an idea, we find such laughable statements as “in clearest terms, Meles Zenawi is both a regime breaker and a regime founder as much prominent as Moa and Lenin were.” Habtamu qualifies the post-2010 government of Meles as “a dynamic and functioning regime or the developmental state in action probably as exactly intended and designed.” He defines the government as a “success story” and entirely dismisses its so-called democratic shortcomings.
Unsurprisingly,­ in light of the undeniable success of Meles, Habtamu concludes that any talk of reform must assume one direction, which is that it must be “a reform proposal within an undergoing and unfinished reform project.” In other words, reform must deepen and perfect Meles’s project; it cannot be an advocacy of a different path or a return to a previous model of economic and political development. Here the author cannot refrain from sharing his major worry about possible reversals when he writes: “I have every reason to get alarmed about the possible abortion of this reform.”
When one contrasts the two assessments, despite obvious differences, one finds an underlying common belief. Indeed, Medhane’s criticisms presuppose the belief that Meles had a genuine desire to develop Ethiopia but failed. To validate this assumption, Medhane portrays Meles as a leader fascinated by the economic development of East Asian countries and suggests that “the main objective” of his conversion to the ideology of the developmental state “was to secure regional prominence as a stabilizing force, raise the status of the country, and increase its relevance which will in turn would attract international finances.” Thus, to make sense of Medhane’s paper, we have to keep in mind the underlying assumption, to wit, that Meles had the good intention of developing Ethiopia and that his good intention was derailed by a mistaken ideological belief in the phenomenal potential of the developmental state.
For Habtamu, the so-called derailment is actually a prerequisite for the realization of the developmental state so that what is required is not to change course but to relentless pursue the same path until all the fruits materialize, one of which being the progressive democratization­ of the country. Simply put, Meles had to suspend democratization­ in order to create the condition of democracy, especially in view of the fact that reactionary forces almost gained political prominence in the 2005 election.
Clearly, the two approaches agree on the good intention of Meles: the one maintains that it was derailed, the other claims that it was unfinished, but both agree in saying that Meles wanted the economic and democratic blossoming of Ethiopia. The fact that they share a basic principle (good intention) and yet end up in conflicting analyses questions nothing less than the feasibility of the basic agreement. Their divergent evaluations indicate that their point of departure is untenable and hence invite a different thesis. Since the truthfulness of the different thesis solely lies in its ability to explain the conflicting interpretations­, it distinguishes itself by its coherence, which is the mark of a sound theoretical approach.
Medhane denounces the gap between theory and practice, that is, between the good intention and the actual outcomes. Habtamu retorts by saying that there is no gap; there is simply a misunderstandin­g of the theory, notably of its requirements. The truth is that, every time that there is a conflict between practice and theory, we should suspect the presence of what Karl Marx diagnosed as false consciousness. Far from theory guiding practice, the reverse works for false conscience in that practice guides theory but in such a way that the gap between the two is legitimized, excused, or masked.
Thus, Medhane posits good intention and interprets the gap of practice as derailment. But what if said derailment is in reality the realization of an intention that was not originally blameless? This means that Meles opted for the developmental state because it enabled him to justify a dictatorial rule, which is then the original intention. Accordingly, Meles was consistent all along: he wanted dictatorship, which he however masked by the discourse on developmental state. In justifying dictatorship as necessary to bring about development, the discourse effected a transmutation, for what serves a good cause can no longer be characterized as evil.
This is exactly how Habtamu argues: he metamorphoses the shortcomings of Meles into prerequisites for the implementation of a good cause. Consequently, there are no shortcomings or deviations since they are necessary steps in the actualization of the project. Above all, there is no dictatorship because it is the progressive actualization of a benevolent cause. The road ahead, it follows, must be the continuation of an unfinished project, and not its criticism in the name of immature concern.
Clearly, only the replacement of the good intention by a malicious one can correct the contradiction between the two approaches. The substitution explains the option for the developmental state and portrays the shortcoming, not as postponed future benefits, but as inherent outcomes of a dictatorial goal. Meles neither missed nor paced an alleged initial good intention: he implemented what he originally wanted, namely, absolute power and control.
In this regard, Meles did not see the 2005 electoral defeat of his party as “a pointless disruption,” as Medhane claims. Nor did he perceive it as a setback caused by “internal failures” and an occasion to deepen “aggressively . . . the reform,” as Habtamu puts it. Rather, he reached the realization that his dictatorial project could not go hand in hand with democratic opening, however small the opening may be. The point is that Meles’s dictatorial project, essentially driven by his narcissistic personality, craved for popular approval, obvious as it is that his hunger for personal grandeur needed popular confirmation through regular democratic elections.
The rise and popularity of Kinijit made him realize that the quest for a democratic approval was no longer achievable. The 2005 election result was therefore an awakening from his illusion about his popularity and underestimation­ of the opposition. Predictably, profoundly humiliated by the electoral success of the opposition, he reacted violently and since then opted for an attenuated version of the North Korean type of dictatorship in which he would obtain the popularity that he wants by silencing the opposition and subjecting the people to brainwashing and personality cult.
I thus agree with Medhane when he says that the reversal of democratic opening in 2005 was a strategy to “change the national mood and turn the opposition into a fringe movement and the margins of society.” Where I differ is when Medhane assumes that he planned to obtain the change by developing the country economically so that ordinary people will support him as they see improvements in their conditions of life. To say so goes against the general consensus describing Meles as well-read and smart. I do not deny that he had such qualities, but I also raise the question of knowing how a well-read and smart person launches a developmental state while perfectly knowing that he has none of the necessary political conditions, not to mention the fact that he surrounded himself by corrupt and incompetent people (on this issue, see my article Meles Zenawi’s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State: Dead-Ends and Exit, ttp://www.scribd.com/­doc/58593218/­Debate-on-Develo­pmental-State-E­thiopian-Schola­rs).
Again, what Meles liked in the developmental state is not the economic prospects but the dictatorial aspect, that is, the centralization of all power in the name of economic development. Otherwise, he would have tried to create the necessary preconditions which, as indicated in the above cited article, include a turn toward a genuine nationalist policy and the championing of leadership competence and integrity in all decision-making­ apparatuses. The truth is that Meles’s grandiosity could not be content with a petty dictatorship; it needed the appearance of serving a noble cause. Since the decline of the socialist ideology and the prevalence of liberalism, what else is left of forms of dictatorial rule with some usable prestige but the developmental state?
This is so true that his successors, aware of the hollowness of Mele’s legacy, cannot see any other way of protecting their status and interests than by glorifying to the point of ridicule his person and “achievements” and vowing to continue his policy in the hope of acquiring some legitimacy. This is exactly the message of Habtamu’s article: let us not undermine by critical appraisal the form of dictatorship guaranteeing the protection of our positions and interests. The only way forward for us is to canonize Meles and to present ourselves as the disciples eager to continue the crusade for the developmental state.
To sum up, the only consistent evaluation of Meles’s rule is the one centered on his fundamental goal of absolute power. Nothing of what Meles has done is intelligible unless we relate it to absolute power as his driving ethos. Any other working thesis lands nowhere but in the contradictory idea of derailment or the abuse of mystification. It is high time to call a spade a spade, especially for those who are beginning to wake up from the illusions of ethnonationalis­t discourses.

NEVIS Review NO 3 Section I : Ref# 3.1

 NEVIS Review NO 3 
Section I 
 Ref# 3.1

 Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian state :Understanding the late prime minister and his dream for the nation" 

by Medhane Tadessei 
 (credit: pambazuka.com)

INTRODUCTION
Meles Zenawi and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 after a 16-year armed struggle in the countryside. In subsequent years Meles Zenawi rose to have disproportionate power in the Ethiopian state, rising above the TPLF/EPRDF. As an instructor, theoretician, military strategist, intellectual and all-around, all-star politician of the EPRDF Meles shaped Ethiopian politics for over two decades and worked hard to sustain the political system he helped create. This is crucial in understanding the meaning of his death and its impact on the nature of political power in Ethiopia. And equally important, to understand what this says about the character of the Ethiopian state. Meles Zenawi, with a touch of overstatement, is the most important person who has ever lived in the history of the TPLF and the post-1991 political order in Ethiopia. It need also be appreciated that Meles has effectively become, or merged with, the state and hence his absence or death is in effect a mortal blow to the health status of not only the political system but also the Ethiopian state. [Ii] This is not the place to write about the turning points in the political rise of Meles Zenawi [iii] , but instead to draw from existing analysis a comprehensive understanding of his political trajectory and the otherwise-puzzling aspects of his legacy. [iv]
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
 Only few political leaders in contemporary Africa have been both great thinkers and astute political operatives. Perhaps the most gifted of them all was Meles Zenawi. Meles’s early rise to political supremacy has always been an object of fascination yet one shrouded in mystery. There are many ways to explain Meles’s rise to prominence in Ethiopian politics. My own sense points to three, in fact four, major factors. Prominent among which are his quick intelligence and communication skills. Meles is the most gifted orator the TPLF has produced. He has been a formidable debater, particularly in a closed circuit among party disciples. Often, he could be convincing as well as flirtatious. A veracious reader he had the tendency to read everything that mattered to his cause. He was known for his piercing intellect and brutal study schedule. He read at a prodigious speed, extracting the essence of a book along with a vast amount of detail, which he blended with information derived from other sources and the reality of his environment. This doesn’t mean all his ideas were great. Some of his inputs would be more brilliant than others; and some might be wrong, but his hard work and his propensity to supply fresh ideas would cumulatively convey the image of a brilliant leader. Meles was an accomplished politician. He was also an unusually gifted thinker. The intertwining of these talents formed the overriding force behind his quiet and stealthy rise to power. But also he was, by default or design, strategically placed to make an impact in the early days of the struggle. He was fortunate in his assignment and his colleagues, but he was more fortunate still in some of his closest friends in the TPLF leadership. From the beginning of the armed struggle Meles was well positioned to advance in the leadership of the TPLF. The young revolutionary, whose rise to prominence owed everything to quick study in the TPLF Cadre School, had little involvement in the war. Meles’ work on political and ideological perspectives to the exclusion of military or other responsibilities permitted him to develop a considerable level of knowledge, as well as the opportunity to train and organize cadres and disseminate his views. He used to invoke great leaders and depict them in his style of teaching in order to get across his arguments. He got on well with students, the rank and file and his colleagues alike, because they expected him to know more than they did, and they rarely knew enough to challenge him. These roles also gave him a unique relationship with, and understanding of, the cadres that was to prove beneficial in the future. It was his skill as a political operative, his devotion to reading and writing that won him the favour of his party leaders that it can be easy to forget that he has spent the better part of his 16 years in the armed struggle not as a military leader but an ideologue and debater. Likewise, in the last three years that led to the downfall of the Derg, while certainly immersed in military affairs, spent much of his time putting out political fires and preparing himself for big roles. Was this sharp intelligence, inexhaustible curiosity, and encyclopaedic knowledge intimidating? Certainly. By late 1989 he was getting near the top. He didn’t claim it; he earned it. There are other ways, too, that Meles has departed from his comrades. Far more interesting, and potentially more consequential, was his sense of appreciation of power. Meles and his thoughts on the nature of political power is a story that has received only intermittent attention in the mainstream narrative of the TPLF/EPRDF. Though his theoretical excursions were extremely relevant and highly considered by the top leadership and Meles provided ideological perspectives to save the organization, of equal significance was a contest over power. There is an element there that is extraordinary creativity, but I can’t say it is divorced from a sense of ambition. This is the more so because in almost all the political struggles that broke out within the TPLF personal differences figured prominently along with ideological differences. No doubt, in each inter-party crisis Meles assumed a leading role providing solutions, which at the same time enhanced his power in the organization. However, the event that transformed Meles into an undisputed leader in the organization and the country as a whole was the 2001 split within the TPLF, which dealt a serious blow to democratic centralism and collective leadership, while at the same time giving Meles a major tactical advantage. The turn of events in the last round of the war with Eritrea and the crisis within the TPLF brought Meles back into the center stage of Ethiopian politics. He was the first to suffer personally from the war and its outcome. But he made the best out of it and emerged much stronger. Once the most formidable leaders of the TPLF, who made collective leadership both possible and attractive, were pushed from the scene, it was probably a matter of time before Meles would become the unchallenged leader of the country. The few prophetic views which drew attention to this trend passed unheeded both within and outside the party. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister, chairman of both the TPLF and EPRDF, together with his close followers quickly assumed the upper hand in the contest and then initiated what was held to be a wide-ranging restructuring of power in the Ethiopian state. Everything that happened after that was the direct consequence of this fateful political intermission. THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION Right after the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and the split with in his core political party the TPLF, Meles had concentrated power in his own hands and a tiny group of advisors. The irony of the whole matter appeared in the fact that the leader who stood to lose from the blowback effect of the war quickly turned the situation to his advantage and emerged victorious. Thanks to his extraordinary talent aided by the generosity of fate, Meles did not only wither away the threat to his power but he had slowly but steadily worked his way to a supreme position in the Ethiopian state. At the time John and myself concluded that ‘Ideological concerns and struggles for power merged in ways that can still not be completely understood, but it can be said with confidence that the result is a shift in power from Tigray to the central government in Addis Ababa, from the instruments of the party to the state, and from a group among the TPLF Central Committee to Meles.’ [vi] Almost instanteneously, probably the last major obstacle in his path to political supremacy was removed. This marked the beginning of a long process of the personification of the state. The rise of Meles to a dominant and undisputed position in the Ethiopian state had far reaching political implications. It weakened the rest of the political forces within and outside the ruling party, decimated other centers of power and influence and immobilized the TPLF, the most organized political force in the post-1991 Ethiopian landscape. [Vii] There is no doubt that the removal of the rather well-entrenched and adamant party leaders would give him the opportunity to seize the full reins of power and make a clean start in the affairs of the state. He tried hard to relocate his power base from Tigray and the TPLF to the Center and the EPRDF with some success. Thus the progressive political ascendancy of Meles was paralleled by growing political strength at the Center. He created a centralized government and a party leader unified with the state, making the party, the government of the day and the state one and the same. He promoted loyal bureaucrats than party loyalists which served to reinforce a clearly identifiable power pyramid. In doing this he created a power base independent of all the members of the ruling party. While this made the TPLF less influential in the EPRDF it also made the EPRDF less relevant in running the government, much less so the Ethiopian state. As predicted the merger of Meles and the Ethiopian state heated up after the 2005 elections. In the next seven years or so Meles, more able and astute than his inveterate subordinates, continued his steady rise. From such a base he launched the Developmental State in Ethiopia. Having attained the height of power, Meles stood poised to start his ambitious experiment. This was not accidental as he had a philosophy in favour of a strong state with a strong leader as a prerequisite for the successful running of a developmental state. This was the life that he decided to live, and the mission he wanted to pursue. Consolidating his power and increasing the developmental mission of the Ethiopian state were Meles’s consuming focus. Both were inseparable. It was to be the major historical achievement of Meles that he finally spread the tentacles of the developmental state in Ethiopia. Without this, he surely would have become a mere footnote in modern Ethiopian history. Meles’s project of modernizing Ethiopia through the prism of a developmental state had a bearing on the kind of political order that evolved over the last seven years. This is closely related to his view towards state power, how he exercised it and the style of his leadership. This informs his personality, his place in Ethiopian history and the nature of the problem his successors face.

MELES’S PROJECT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
Whatever we might say about Meles Zenawi, we must grant that he had a well-prepared and well-sequenced plan for inserting his version of the developmental state. And it is crucial to keep in mind the things that influenced his theory of developmental state. Meles was particularly fascinated by the process of industrial development in East Asia, particularly South Korea in the 1960’s. [viii] He took pains to extract the most original elements from the thought and acts of General Park Chung Hee of South Korea whose work is more compatible with his. [ix] Park’s supreme attraction to Meles was economic. The important thing is that the Park regime initiated a successful program of industrialization for South Korea based upon export-oriented industries which were guided and aided by the government. One of the first things Park did after assuming power, more or less replicated in Ethiopia, was to persecute South Korean business leaders for profiting from the corruption in the South Korean government. The motivation for this was to gain control of the flow of capital in the country so it could be directed into the sectors that the government wanted to develop. Compare that with the economic policies of the Ethiopian government especially as it is related to banking and telecommunication sector. The control of these resources was critical for Meles. The priority has been on state directed investment, political control, the economic empowerment of the peasantry, infrastructural development and the control of capital with a clear tension between control and development. He had a firm belief few things should be met as a prerequisite for economic transformation in Ethiopia: Stability, ethnicity and social mobilization, strong state and the mobilization of international resource. He had created all of them. This became the essence of Meles’s developmental state in Ethiopia. The role of the state in encouraging and directing investment was highly pronounced but also attracting international aid and finances as well as investment was strongly pursued. A strong state and stability for economic development also informed the conduct of his foreign policy, peacekeeping role and the war on terror. [x] The main objective was to secure regional prominence as a stabilizing force, raise the status of the country, and increase its relevance which would in turn would attract international finances. Accordingly, he worked hard to restructure the Ethiopian state and its economy with a profound impact. He tried to bridge the gap between the state and development, a recurring problem in the African context. He initiated the arduous process of reorganizing the state, with a particular focus on building the structural foundations of a dynamic economy. Even the bedrock of his foreign policy was highly monetized to support the grand project. Effectively using foreign aid for development was another important weapon. [xi] He was focused and precise on his programmes. Meles had done what he intended to do and followed his plan meticulously until his death. Here was a man with immense energy and enormous vitality. He attempted to reorient Ethiopia’s political economy by carrying out far-reaching reforms, and in particular introducing the fundamentals, for what it’s worth, of an Ethiopian version of a developmental state. Needless to say Meles had a rigorously empirical understanding of the way it operated. It is against this background that his absence and its far-reaching implications need to be understood. Arguably, Meles seems to have decided to delay, or probably ignore altogether, the process of democratization for the sake of solidifying the developmental state. He believed practicing the details of Western democracy stands in the way of fully implementing the fundamentals of such a state. He argued the new economic structures and institutions required their own political organization such as a hegemonic party. On this he had clear thinking and meticulously invested on it. His was a conscious decision. He believed human rights, free press and strong parliament distracts the agendas of the developmental state particularly in its formative stage. Meanwhile he questioned the assertion that human rights and democracy are closely linked to economic development in Africa where primitive accumulation of wealth takes center stage. Decidedly, he shelved democratic transition in favour of modernizing Ethiopia through a strong state. On the other hand he didn’t feel the pressure to democratize. In the meantime he expected a speedy socio-economic delivery that could fundamentally change the political marketplace. And he thought the Ethiopian context, history and political culture would allow him to do that for sometime to come. In this regard it is highly likely that he had been informed by the so-called Oriental Despotism. Ethiopia, like many in the East which economically transformed themselves within a short period of time can be a fertile ground for authoritarian rule, a prerequisite for entrenching the developmental state. The thesis is both understandable and mildly disingenuous. There is no doubt some aspects of Ethiopia’s political culture stand in the way of the widespread democratic aspirations of Ethiopians. Totalitarian culture- top-down rule; primacy of the collective over the individual; a well-organized, self-serving mammoth bureaucracy; a subservient, fatalistic attitude towards officials and politics; lack of public spirit - has existed in Ethiopia for thousands of years and has formed certain ingrained mind-sets and habits which still endure as the most tenacious obstacle in the country’s path toward true democracy. Compounding this was Meles’s openly declared hegemonic project. We do not know enough about the impact of Ethiopian history in Meles’s thinking at this time to say for certain how profound an effect this had on the events following the 2005 elections. But it is fair to say that he promoted the notion that an aggressive policy confined exclusively on economic development is worth pursuing. It would be a mistake to see all this as fatalistic and a deliberate negative assault on the process of democratization in Ethiopia. However controversial this may sound Meles had his own best hopes. And he was eager to be validated and this is discernible in the sense of urgency of his actions. He craved his economic polices would bring about quick results on the ground changing the political mood in the country in his favour. As such he thought the democratic upheaval in 2005 as a pointless disruption. Right after the brutal crackdown of opposition protesters he resolved to speed up economic delivery. It was meant to be Ethiopia’s Tiananmen. Practical results in economic terms became his constant and prime concern. He never let go of the conviction that Ethiopia will turn a page and change the national mood and turn the opposition in to a fringe movement and the margins of society. [xii] Part of Meles’s difficulty is that his worldview was inherently leftist and thoroughly authoritarian. But intellectual honesty demands acknowledging that his moral vision derives, to a considerable extent, from the tradition and political culture of the TPLF and Ethiopia at large. The culture that produced Meles Zenawi is pretty much the same culture, it seems fair to say, that created previous leaders and that runs our country right now. His inability to see the need to allow more political space and parallel development of democracy and the severity and determination with which he decided to crush the opposition and for that matter any form of dissent-one of orders of magnitude - suggests an ideological commitment of the sort that usually reflects devotion to a political project or a creed. As a result there are some grounds for questioning whether Meles’s project is even fair, safe or meaningful. The fundamentals of the developmental state in Ethiopia, however useful and important it may sound, need to be revisited. In any case, it’s hard to believe that Meles’s wholesale offensive against any form of independent centers of power such as free media, free organizations, free business; persecution of critical journalists and enactment of repressive laws were unconnected to his creed of the developmental state. Meles tried to insert the rudiments of the developmental state and it is up to the rest of Ethiopians and the country’s emerging leaders to make it more humane. It is possible to reform the developmental state without allowing its pillars being eaten away by usual termites: ethnic entrepreneurs, countless locust oligarchs, political repression, rent seeking and corruption. We should not, though, conclude that there’s no debate whatever to be had between developmental state and political liberalization. The view and political project championed by Meles that the two endeavors are utterly distinct and thus incapable of interfering with each other is overly simplistic, toxic and dangerous. It is equally possible to isolate Meles’s preoccupation with duality of authoritarianism and economic development. It is possible to have both a strong and well governed state. No decent analyst can fail to be repulsed by the sins committed in the name of the developmental state. So we all agree: mingling development with authoritarianism can be bad. But the critical question is: compared to what? Where do we draw the line between what the developmental state can accomplish and what it should be allowed to accomplish. These questions are difficult and might merit an honest and extended discussion among all concerned Ethiopians, and it is exactly for the same reason Ethiopia’s emerging leaders should not suppress critical thinking. But if such discussions are to be worthwhile, they will have to take place at a far higher level of sophistication and within the context of a more open and conducive political environment.

CONCLUSION At his best, Meles inserted the rudiments of the developmental state in Ethiopia, but at his worst he made it intimidating and suffocating. It is the latter that should draw the attention of Ethiopia’s emerging leaders as the most urgent problem that needs to be fixed. It is time for the country to move beyond its authoritarian past and build a democracy that matches the democratic aspirations of its people and supports its development.
 KEY ISSUES The modalities of the developmental state need to be redefined. There is a need for political reforms both to meet the democratic aspirations of the Ethiopian people, achieve political stability as well as the revitalize the much needed developmental state model [xiii]. Ethiopia’s economic development must be anchored in a strong political process, a prerequisite for long-term stability. If the current trend persists, it is extremely worrisome development for the health, perhaps the viability, of the Ethiopian state. Political reform must include appropriate constitutional reform, such as the articles related to the power of the Prime Minister as well as the governance of the security sector.
. END NOTES
 [ii]Writing this piece started long before the untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and it became apparent to update it to fit into the current reality. Interests in the political life and legacy of Meles Zenawi seem to come in waves. When asked about the legacy of Meles Zenawi by the media I said I was impressed by his focus on the economy and disappointed by his political record. His sudden death was harrowing news as I had the hope that he would introduce political reform and retire. This might have been the only path for a win-win situation for him as a leader and the country he led.
 [iii] Medhane Tadesse & John Young, TPLF: Reform or Decline. Review of African Political Economy. London 2001.
 [iv] This study inevitably has depended largely on free quotations from earlier works of the author on the same subject and some discussions with individuals, but for reasons that will be apparent the sources cannot always be acknowledged.
[V] Many remember him in his portrayal of Mao Tse-tung in the TPLF Cadre School. [vi] TPLF: Reform or Decline in Review of African Political Economy 2001.
 [vii] This partly explains the great deal of apprehension associated with his death; that is why all life, it seems, is up in the air.
 [viii] Upon meeting the Korean president Lee Myung-bak in 2010 Meles is said to have greatly impressed him on his knowledge about the process of industrialization in that country. ix Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation. Acropolis Books. Washington DC, 1971. His economic plan followed the creation of a new constitution, the Yushin Constitution, which increased the power of the government and suppressed political opposition. The same happened in Ethiopia after the 2005 elections while draconian laws were introduced after the 2010 elections

Monday, October 15, 2012

NEVIS Review No 2 Section I, (B) :Ref # 2.1.(B)



NEVIS Review Series No 2
Section I, (B)
 Ref # 2.1.(B) 
October 15, 2012

ETHIOPIA: HAILEMARIAM'S RISE TO POWER: BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN?
By Berihu Assefa

In this article, I attempt to answer two related questions regarding Ethiopia’s first orderly and peaceful leadership transition following the sudden and untimely death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Firstly, I attempt to explore how the orderly and peaceful leadership succession came to happen; and its significance in the Ethiopian political economy. Secondly, I examine how Hailemariam’s installment as Prime Minister is related to Ethiopia’s grand development plan. I approach these questions from the perspective of Ethiopia’s vision, development and governance model.
The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi envisioned not only Ethiopia’s development and governance model but also the kind of leadership required to execute the charted policies astutely and deliver superior results. It does not take Sherlock Holmes to unravel that one of Meles’ 'last wills' had been to clearly instruct key EPRDF officials to maintain and execute the development model he charted for Ethiopia, which includes installing Hailemariam, a technocrat, in his place. There are good indicators that Hailemariam Desalegn was named the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia with a clear instruction from Meles. One such indicator is that Hailemariam was announced as Meles' successor soon after the state media broadcasted news of the passing of Meles Zenawi in August though Hailemariam’s official sworn in took place in September after an extraordinary parliamentary session was summoned. The selection process that took place in the EPRDF congress later in September was simply to formalize Hailemariam's ascendancy. The rise of Hailemariam to power indicates a shift of power from career politicians to career technocrats. For this and other reasons I will discuss in subsequent paragraphs, I consider the transfer of power from career politicians to career technocrats as one of the main legacies of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.
Hailemariam rose to the highest power in the country in an orderly and peaceful manner. What does this signify; and is it designedly related to Ethiopia’s overall development plan? I have read a couple of write-ups on this issue both by international and domestic political pundits. While some consider Hailemariam's rise as a historic political event that shows a shift of power from the long-time power occupier highlanders to the low-landers or a shift in power from traditional orthodoxy to unorthodoxy power occupiers; others adamantly oppose this view saying the rise of Hailemariam is simply part of a gesture by TPLF to deceptively send a message that other ethnic groups can assume power. On the other hand, others attempted to give it a religious and minority rights context. Well, most of these interpretations are understandable and do not necessarily lack a grain of truth but I do not think the religious, ethnic and geography dimensions of Hailemariam's ascendancy to power are profound changes. Particularly, this single incident cannot be a yardstick to make sweeping statements regarding minority rights, political inclusiveness, religious equality or democratic culture.
In my view, the most profound and visible change is a leadership transition from career politicians to career technocrats. Meles was a career politician. So are his vanguard comrades. Meles became a politician at the age of 19. Throughout the 1990s, Ethiopia lacked policy clarity and autonomy. Consequently, Ethiopia did virtually nothing economically in the 1990s. The 1990s was almost a lost decade for Ethiopia (and so was the 1980s by the way). The late Meles Zenawi in his keynote speech for the Africa Task Force which was chaired by Joseph Stiglitz in Brooks World Poverty Institute (UK) said: "While I cannot say that we had an alternative to the neoliberal reforms that the IMF and World Bank wanted us to introduce, we have never been comfortable with it from the very beginning." As Meles’ intellectual rigor grew by the day, he started to question the "one size fits all development model" laid out by the Western institutions based on the principles of the Washington consensus. At that time, the East Asian development experience as an alternative path to development was a hot talking point but it was not as dominant as the neoliberal model. In fact, for quite a long time, the East Asian development model was rather treated as an exception within the framework of the dominant view, neoliberalism. However, over time, the East Asian countries following the footsteps of Japan (the leading goose) converted themselves from ashes to riches. This extraordinary performance started to speak for itself and attracted the attention of scholars and leaders worldwide; and, hence, the East Asian development model emerged as an alternative path to development.
By the beginning of the 2000s, Ethiopia officially rejected the Washington Consensus and embraced a reconfigured version of the East Asian development model. Meles who authored this paradigm shift preferred to call Ethiopia’s reconfigured version of the East Asian model as democratic developmentalism (DD). Confidently, in domestic and international podiums, Meles started to publicly express his disapproval of the neoliberal model and argued that a reconfigured version of the East Asian development model was relevant for Africa. The basic principle of the East Asian development model, a model that made the East Asians prosperous in just less than 50 years, is that the state and the market complement one another and provide an excellent joint outcome.
One of the main features of the East Asian model is technocracy. During Asia’s miraculous periods, the East Asian Tigers were ruled and managed by technocrats who were mostly engineers by profession. When Meles emulated the East Asian model, he knew from his East Asian reading that technocracy in leadership and bureaucracy was indispensable. It was in this spirit that he himself started to appear more like a technocrat than a career politician; and started to bring in more technocrats into government leadership and bureaucracy at all levels starting from lower level administrative units, i.e., Kebeles and Weredas, to highest government posts. However, this was by no means adequate and above all the task of filling government leadership and bureaucracy with technocrats is not a piece of cake when you have entrenched career politicians who would never want to see a technocrat around them.
The rise of the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, is part of this grand plan. Following the East Asian experience, Meles wanted Ethiopian technocrats to take over major leadership positions, including his place. The rationale behind this is pretty obvious: if the state is to assume active role in the economy, it must deliver not just mediocre results, but results that match the superior East Asian performance. And the state can deliver impressive results when it is led by technocrats than when it is led by career politicians. We do not have to go to East Asia to verify this. We have seen how technocrats deliver here at home from Dr. Tewodros Adhanom’s extraordinary performance in the health sector.
However, it must also be noted that there is a dark side to the East Asian technocracy experience. It was authoritarian developmentalism (AD). The prime and undistracted goal for the East Asian authoritarian technocratic leaders was economic development. Then economic development, which can be expressed as the rise of middle class society, leads to democratization. The direction of causation in the East Asian AD model ran from economic reforms to political democratization.
While learning from policy successes of others is quite essential and wise, one cannot copy a foreign (and past) model as it is. Foreign economic or social models need to be adapted to fit local realities and modern times. Cognizant of this, Meles developed the democratic developmentalism (DD), a highly reconfigured version of the East Asian AD model. In today’s YouTube and Facebook world, let alone totalitarianism, mediocre democratic outcomes are totally frowned. Then the question is: is Meles’ DD model really democratic? Well, this is debatable. But at least one thing is clear: while Meles’ legacy of impressive economic results: robust economic growth in the past decade, social development (education and health) and extreme poverty reduction by about a third are uncontested (or at least less contested); his records on democratic reforms tend to be mixed. However, despite his mixed record on the first D of Meles' DD model, he still deserves tribute for carving the new DD model for Ethiopia which the current new generation of leadership must extend and do better on both Ds.
For the 1960s and 1970s East Asian technocrat leaders, the prime goal was only economic development. The AD model was normal back then because domestic and international conditions were less pressing and restrictive; but it is less so now. Thus, the new Ethiopian Prime Minister must voraciously embark not only on economic development but also on democratic reforms. It must be noted that the model Meles charted for Ethiopia is DD, not AD. And the DD must live up to its name. We have been the poster child of Africa for long. Ethiopia is trying hard to dispel this bad image. Ethiopian We can no more afford to have other bad images. However, in the last few years, Ethiopia drafted some draconian laws that could undermine its democratic reforms and tarnish its image in the areas of freedom of speech and press. I do not think Ethiopia can afford to be the repression face of Africa. Our laws and culture must tolerate dissents. Dissent should never be equated with anti-peace. More importantly, draconian laws interfere not only with human and democratic rights, but also with business and investment opportunities. There is no doubt that democracy is a process; but a process means that we have to witness incremental changes every time. However small the changes may be, Ethiopia must move forward, not backward.
As an anecdote whether it is possible to deliver both development and democratic outcomes at the same time, I would give this example. The founding fathers of the U.S. were technocrats. They were able to deliver satisfactory democratic and development outcomes over an extended period. Of course, today’s developing countries including Ethiopia should not take 200 years to develop and democratize because they can easily learn from policy successes of others and chart a much shorter paths to development and democracy concurrently.
In a nutshell, I would say Ethiopia’s first orderly and peaceful leadership transition is a major political progress. To a rounding error, this orderly and peaceful leadership transition could be viewed as a harbinger of political maturity and groundwork towards a ballot system. I believe Ethiopians must welcome it in this context. In this article, I have tried to show that Hailemariam’s rise to the Premiership position has been Meles’ plan and instruction; and this has something to do with Ethiopia’s development model. Ethiopia’s DD model aims to register high and speedy economic growth and steady incremental democratic reforms. To robustly achieve this, Meles wanted a technocrat successor to commendably implement his East Asian inspired policies. But then installing Hailemariam as Prime Minister would mean taking power from the hands of career politicians to technocrats. Given that most of EPRDF officials are career politicians, it might not have been easy for Meles to convince his comrades about the idea of shifting power from career politicians to career technocrats. Potential concerted resistance from career politicians might have been neutralized by Meles’ persuasion power and influence, and Hailemariam’s commanding personality. It must be clear that Hailemariam Desalegn has been involved in detailing Ethiopia’s vision and economic policies and, hence, has arguably a better understanding of Ethiopia’s policies and strategies though he does not have a thick resume when it comes to foreign policy issues. Finally, I wish PM Hailemariam to have productive leadership years. 

(Ed's not BerihuAssefa is a PhD candidate in Development Economics in GRIPS, Tokyo
(Credit- nazret.com) 
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NEVIS Review No 2, Section II; Ref #2.2



NEVIS Review Series No 2
 Section  II
 Ref #2.2
October 15, 2012

Lessons From Meles Zenawi
By Charles Abugre

We believed that Ethiopia was crucial to this for several reasons: it is the largest country by population in the region; relatively the most stable; relatively the most democratic; with the most dynamic economy; with a lot to lose if war broke out across several boundaries and the most to gain with peace; and relatively the most trusted by international powers.

Above all, the person of Meles commands the most respect internationally for his intellect and negotiating ability and not least because he is seen as a person whose word you can trust- love him or loath him.

He could afford more magnanimity, more patience and more sacrifice relative to the rest.

So initially we spoke about dialogue, bringing young people together across boundaries, making overtures to belligerent neighbours, avoiding the use of Ethiopia as a centre for organized opposition for regime change of neighbours etc.

All well and good, but how in the long run can peace be sustained and entrenched?

Does peace and the lack of thereof depend on individuals in power or is there more to it? Is armed conflict sustained merely by political motives or is there an economic motive?

Do people fight simply because they hate each other or is there more to it?

As we mauled over these issues over time, one thing became increasingly clear – we need to think about peace and security in our continent in a long term manner.

Relative peace is ultimately built on shared prosperity, shared opportunity, mature institutions, greater choices and effective voice for people and a serious attention to inequalities especially geographical and group-based inequalities.

Meles argued that sustaining peace and security in Ethiopia and the region will require us to think about how to shape the economy to provide enduring benefits for all the people and address poverty, how to shape politics to make it inclusive of all the diversities and how to build institutions that promote genuine democratic inclusion.

This calls for a clear understanding of the structural realities of economies and the institutions in it (public and private); the nature of political organisation and the attitude towards genuine democracy and inclusive and dynamic economies, and how these issues interlink.

The task is to simultaneously build institutions for both genuine democracy and genuine development.

He believed that the Ethiopian state is at risk of disappearing unless these tasks are accomplished. This task is daunting for a poor economy because poverty itself results from and contributes to weak institutions necessary to provide and regulate.


• The Ideological Imperative

To square these brackets Meles argues for a clear ideology, contrary to Susan Rice’s assertion that Meles was merely pragmatic, not ideological.

Indeed he believes that not only should the state be guided by a clear ideology but that ideology should he hegemonic in Gramscian context.

The ideology, he calls “democratic developmentalism” (DD) – the task is to build a democratic developmental state.

To make this ideology hegemonic requires a political vehicle – a party totally committed to the ideology and driving it through society through education, policy and organisation.

Meles believes in his party, fights within it, survives it and sees himself as an integral part of it.

He is clear that the economic development task of DD is to build a capitalist economy based on the reality of the Ethiopian economy – an essentially agricultural economy dominated by smallholder farmers facing unstable and hostile local and international markets and small modern sector benefitting largely from unproductive and “pervasive rent-seeking”. By rent-seeking he means economic agents seeking ways to maximise returns in ways that are unconnected with efforts to add value.

This includes corruption in public and private places but it also means kick-backs, land speculation, tax dodging, asset price manipulation, speculative activities etc.

The task is to guide economic agents towards value added activities, including innovation and productive investments and to discourage unproductive rent seeking activities.

But some economic rents are high not simply because of manipulation and bad behaviour of economic agents but arise from low competition (few entrants into sectors at relatively low cost and high returns).

In these areas, he believed that the role of the state is to participate in these markets to share the returns or redirect them through taxation.

To be able to guide the private sector towards value addition necessitates a degree of independence of the state from the private sector. But it means actively discouraging political leadership from also being enmeshed in private business, in order to minimise conflict of interest.

This does not of course preclude jointly investing, as is the case of the burgeoning shoe industry.

It is in this context that the Ethiopian state actively participates in or even dominates late corporations such as the telecommunications, heavy industry and the thriving EFFORT (the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray) group of companies and areas they consider necessary to stimulate or to capture and redirect rents.

It is also the reason why Ethiopia refuses to establish a stock market, seeing them largely as instruments for speculation.

Ethiopia also does not open its banks to foreign participation.

This approach is largely derived from the practice of the middle income countries of Asia and Latin America, and to some extent South Africa.

• The Road to Capitalism

Meles did not come to accept a version of capitalism lightly. He was after all a Marxist Leninist.

He came to this view from a pragmatic standpoint – the world has moved on and a smatter strategy is required.

“You need to pick your fights cleverly” he will say, conscious of the relative powerlessness of Ethiopia as an aid and food dependent economy.

Clever picking of fights has enabled Meles to basically effectively manage aid inflows even during times of political tensions and policy disagreements especially with the World Bank, the IMF and some bilateral donors, although it must be said that over the past two decades Ethiopia’s aid receipt has been below the Sub-Saharan African average in per capita terms.

Yet, many would say that they (together with Rwanda) have made the best use of aid of any country – another reason for keeping aid flowing.

Meles would severely critique aid not in order to reject it but in order to soften the terms and access more.

Meles is comfortable with foreign direct investment although he will argue that development is not about capital accumulation but innovation, technology and organisation. Indeed, with the financial crisis leading to low investment absorption in matured economies and average wages rising in China, Meles has been arguing strongly for foreign capital flows to Africa, presenting it as the next source of global demand capable of lifting the global economy.

And he has not failed in his pursuit.

Sixty percent of Chinese and Turkish investments to Ethiopia are in manufacturing and these investments are growing.

• Practical Human Rights

Meles passionately believes in democracy and human rights – both civil/political and social economic rights – contrary to popular belief.

Two things are critical for democracy in a democratic developmental state: the need to address the powerless of the “atomised peasant” by enabling the peasants to organise not for organising sake but to acquire economic power, for example through co-operatives in order to access technology or to address pricing problems.

Organised wealthy peasants are crucial not only for the fight against poverty but for effective voice in political contestation – the avoidance of elite capture of politics.

The second task, he would argue is the need for a hegemonic party not only to support this process of organising for economic participation and value-added growth but also to educate in order to advance the hegemonic ideology not by force but by gradual internalisation of its tenets.

In the context of electoral politics, such a strategy – linking political organisation with economic power – cannot escape the charge that the ruling party is using incumbency and the monopoly over state resources to entrench the party in power.

Meles does not contest this charge per se, merely arguing that this is what needs to be done.

Besides theory, Meles also emphasises the quality of practice: when you think and plan big, then be sure to deliver: when you promise be sure to fulfill; when you decide, be sure to stick by your decision.

The evidence of these dictums are clear for all to see – poverty is reducing at one of the fastest rates in the world, Ethiopia is industrialising; rural incomes are rising; revenue allocation to ethno-linguistically divided states, using distributive justice as the main principle is helping convergence among nationalities and providing services that some communities had never afore experienced.

The economics of democratic developmentalism has clear fruits in Ethiopia.

South Africa declared itself as a developmental state partly thanks to the friendship between Thabo Mbeki and Meles and co-operation between their respective parties.

The Economic Commission for Africa has taken the first steps to encourage intellectuals discourse on DD.

Time will tell if they will sustain it. Ethiopia may well sustain the programmatic dimensions of DD. Only time will tell where the politics of DD will go, with new leadership.
Meles may well have been dictatorial.

Even that, Africa has lost an intriguing, even enigmatic leader and spokesperson. This loss will be hard to replace.

• Charles Abugre works for the United Nations in Africa. The views contained in this article are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer
( Source : http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=7552&title=Lessons+From+Meles+Zenawi