NEVIS REVIEW No 11, Section III
Ref # 11.3
Feb 25, 2012
African political culture and democracy- Part IV (continued)
The Intensification of Predation
By Hiwot Wendimagegn
The new African leaders who embarked to rule nations tangled with
extreme poverty were neither personally wealthy nor were they experienced in
protecting the economic rights of others. They succumbed to the temptation of
using government power, for the accumulation of personal wealth (Rowely
1999:138). The only basis for such wealth accumulation was the diversion of
resources too often provided in the form of international aid, away from
processes of economic development into personal bank accounts in Switzerland and
elsewhere (reports continue to indicate that billions of dollars stolen from
Africa are deposited in Swiss banks. This money is neither accounted for nor
recovered after their depositors, usually presidents and heads of state, are
assassinated or forced out of office (Toteh, 2012) ). Basically, African politicians established
the “economy of plunder” (Bayart et al.,
1999: 71).
McGuire and Olson, (1996 :72-96)
and Rowley 1999, interestingly compare the banditry of the colonial era and
that of the post- independence Africa by dubbing colonial powers “stationary
bandits” and post- independent African political elites as “roving bandits”.
The colonial powers, who systematically robbed Africa of its resources, enjoyed
unchallenged monopoly. “They ensured a certain level of minimalist laws
designed to protect the property rights of their subjects from Internal anarchy,
to defend their monopoly of theft against potential internal and external
aggressors” (Rowely, 1999:138).
To the contrary, the haphazard
nature of post- independence African politics characterized by civil strife,
skirmishes and recurring coups, made power uncertain which in turn made African
bandits erratic or roving. “By definition, the roving bandit does not exhibit a
stable and encompassing interest in the domain over which he rules. In such an
environment, there is little incentive for the bandit to invest in improving
future productive capacity” (ibid:
139). Moreover, when African elites discovered the root to wealth via
embezzling foreign aid, the incentive as well as the necessity for pursuing mutually
benefiting societal goals became minimal. To quote Bayart:
“Thus, if
public enterprises in Africa have recorded such mediocre results, it is almost
exclusively due to the fact that they have been systematically plundered for
purposes of enrichment and accumulation of power by members of the elite. The
methods used include the diversion of funds to private accounts, the failure to
allocate resources to the designated target areas,, the utilization of
institutional resources for private gains, the utilization of an enterprise’s
borrowing capacity for improper purposes, the constitution of private
clientelist networks through nepotism or the creation of unnecessary posts and
so on” (Bayart et al., 1999: 71).
In their insightful book,
“Criminalization of the State in Africa”, Bayart et al. (1991) boldly argue that, the growth of fraud and smuggling,
the plundering of natural resources, the privatization of state institutions
and growth of private armies in post-independence African states has made the state
an instrument for organized criminal activity (Bayart et al., 1999). By the same token, several other authors have
highlighted how extreme authoritarianism and predation in the new states of
Africa hindered the functional utility of formal institutions. All their
researches tried to show that African politics bizarrely integrates
criminalization, corruption, clientelism and patronage into the rubric of
formal politics. Along these lines, Stephen Ellis, in his assessment of South
Africa and how the informal and the formal integrate so well in African
politics has discovered, South Africa
has the continent’s largest formal economy as well as its largest criminal economy (Bayar et al., 1999: 49-68).
Independence therefore did not
lead to major changes in the form and function of African politics. State power
remained for the most part as absolute and as arbitrary as that of the colonial
system. “Political behavior became even more myopic” (Rowely, 1999:139).
Ironically, history repeated itself, only this time in a more anarchic setting.
Throughout Africa, ordinary people started demanding a second independence,
this time from the indigenous leadership whose economic mismanagement together
with brutal repression made mere survival all but impossible (Ake, 1993:240).
As will be discussed subsequently, the politics of plunder intensified statism
and deepened informal networks.
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STATISM AND “INFORMAL” NETWORKS
In most instances, the ruling
class in Africa is a state class because its culture, its basic values, its
power and its economic base results from its tight relationship with the state
(ibid, Callaghy, 1987:68, Chazan,
1994:73-78). State expansion and centralization give ruling elites the
opportunity to maintain political control as well as to accrue unprecedented
wealth amidst great poverty (ibid,
Kasfir, 1985). Since, “the state relies on liquid revenues and interacts with
transnational economic forces, state power became a prime vehicle for material
accumulation, while also enhancing the position of rulers in their competition
with other groups” (Hart, 1982:90).
The state in Africa is a “prize”
for anyone who is lucky enough to have it. Bayart went as far as claiming, access to state power, is predominantly
concerned with access to wealth that “it is a preoccupation that offers very
little hope to World Bank 'privatization' projects, which promise merely to
transfer resources from the formal control of the state, to the private
portfolios of those who rule it” (Clapham, 1994:435). Interestingly, the
obsession with state power and access to all the perks it entails, doesn’t only
affect the ones who rule it but also the ones who are opting for it. “The state and proximity to its resources emerged
as a central determinant of class formation and class relations” (Chazan,
1994:74). Therefore, those who possess state power go to
great length to maintain it and those who don’t, to attain it.
In consequence, the sacrilegious obsession with state power and
possessing it as if its one’s own
personal property, made governments in Africa kleptocratic at worst and
neopatrimonial at best. Kleptocracy is a form of political and government
corruption which exists to increase the personal wealth and political powers of
its officials and the ruling class at the expense of the wider population. In
its original Greek meaning, Kleptocracy simply
meant “rule by thieves”. In such a system, the despots make no attempt to
disguise the fact that they are bandits ( Bayart et al. 1999, Charap and Harm 1999, Fan, 2006). They may even feel
like they are doing the right thing by rewarding themselves for all the pain
they endured to get to the throne (Goldsmith, 2004). These kinds of
governments, the classic example being Mobutu Seseseko’s Zaire, made corruption
a way of life.
On the other hand, neopatrimonialism is characteristic of most of the
current nations of Africa which is personal and informal rule under the
guises of rationality and legality. In
other words, in this type of system, formal laws and institutions exist only to
serve the personal interests of the ruling class which is to cling to power by
all means. Kleptocracies and neopatrimonial systems thus buy off the loyalty of
their citizens because they cannot get it through legitimacy (ibid, Hutchcroft, 1997, Szeftel, 2000,
van de Walle, 2003). As Gunther Roth (1968:196) insightfully argues,
“neopatrimonialism is a synonym of personal rulership as it is based on the
basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique
personal qualifications but inextricably linked to material incentives and
rewards”. These systems thus integrate clientelism, corruption, patronage and
nepotism with the formal affairs of the state.
Heretofore, the elite culture of predatory rule not only affected the
elites but the rest of society as well.
The incorporation of private affairs with official affairs integrates
everyone in corruption, clientelism and nepotism. Be it for a lack of options
or by sharing the same sentiments as its rulers, the rest of society enhances
neopatrimonial predatory rule by selling its loyalty and support, and using its
profession or workplace to get undeserved benefits (Bayart et al., 1999:256). As the
famous Cameroonian adage goes, “goats eat where they are tethered”. Thus,
attesting to the likelihood that the very reason predation endured for years
after independence is because of a society that facilitates its perpetuation.
Bayart’s book “The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly”, is filled with many
enticing stories that reveal the ugly side of predation. This article will end by reciting one such interesting
story of a Zairian air force (FAZA) organization that was forced to close down
due to unprecedented corruption. Here is how the tale goes:
“Every
morning, pilots and mechanics arrived at the base and towed two planes to the
fuel pump of Air Zaire for a complete refueling. As soon as they had been
filled up they were towed back to the hangars where their fuel tanks were
emptied. The first clients of their little operation were the wives of the
soldier based at the CETA training camp, who bought the petrol at half price
then proceeded to resell it in Masina, Kimbaseke and especially Kisangani. It
was not long before the sale of air force fuel became semi- official as no
attempt was made to hide what was happening. Every day, a flood of empty
barrels, big oil drums and all kinds of receptacles passed through the main
entry gate to Ndjili airbus under the watchful eye of guards who, had they been
above corruption, would never have allowed so many customers to pass through,
let alone help them carry their barrels to and from the hangar” (Bayart,
2009:236)
