NEVIS Review No 15
Section III
Ref # 15.3
April 22, 2013
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Meles’s Political Dilemma and the Developmental State:
Dead-Ends and Exit
By Messay Kebede (PhD)
(Excerpts from the article)
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATES
The whole question is to know whether Meles’s new
strategy can be successful in the conditions of Ethiopia. Since success
entirely depends on the ability to furnish appreciable economic growth to the Ethiopian masses, we need to say a few
words about the basic characteristics of the developmental state. According to
many scholars, some crucial and commonly held features define the developmental
state or the Asian mode of development.
MARKET ECONOMY: The commitment to free market must
be unwavering even if the state is called upon to play a leading role both in
terms of planning, investments, and directives. The economic role of the state,
though decisive and extensive, is not tantamount to running the economic
machine, as was the case with the socialist policy; rather, it is to render a
helping hand for the establishment of vibrant private enterprises and a
capitalist class. Besides actual economic functions, the developmental state
supports capitalism by providing a lasting political and social stability
together with the rule of law and the protection of property rights.
The fact that the state assumes a supporting role
significantly reduces rent-seeking activities, such as government extracting
revenues by the control of land and natural resources, the imposition of
exorbitant tax and restrictive regulations affecting free enterprise, or
government agents demanding bribes and other payments from individuals or firms
in exchange for preferential treatments. The net outcome of such rent-seeking
activities is, of course, the prevention of economic growth through the
falsification of market economy and fair distribution. The national wealth
cannot grow in a country where rent-seeking behaviors prevail, since the
imposition of restrictive controls hampers economic activity and an important
part of the wealth goes to a sector that makes no contribution to productivity.
Clearly, in light of most underdeveloped countries being held back by states
that have grown into rent-seeking systems, the supportive role of the
developmental state to market economy constitutes a major shift.
That the state limits its role to supporting
private business does not mean that we are dealing with a weak state, in the
liberal sense of the state confined to providing law and order. The
developmental state requires a strong and authoritarian state, that is, a state
that enjoys financial autonomy, is free of internal cleavages and frictions,
and faces a disabled opposition. It is also endowed with effective institutions
so that it is able to soar above particular social forces. Only thus can it
direct economic forces toward national development and have enough leverage to
prevail over adverse forces.
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: The strength of the state is
actually a condition for the other defining character of the developmental state,
namely, the autonomy of the bureaucracy. Indeed, bureaucrats rather than the
political elite supervise and direct the economy, with the consequence that,
unlike the ruling political elite, the bureaucracy is established on the basis
of merit, efficiency, and high skills. What is required of the bureaucrats is
less political allegiance than efficiency in exchange for handsome
remunerations. The advantages enjoyed by the bureaucrats are, therefore, not
due to rent-seeking activities but to their contribution to economic growth.
DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED ELITE: What makes the autonomy
of bureaucracy possible is the control of state power by development-oriented
political elites. Instead of using the state to sideline rival elites, as is
often the case in underdeveloped countries, such elites are motivated by the
desire to increase the national wealth. As they make political legitimacy
conditional on economic achievement, they allow an autonomous functioning of
the bureaucracy, given that autonomy is how bureaucracy can function
efficiently. Such is not the case in rent-seeking states: government is used to
undermine rival elites for the simple reason that the dearth of economic growth
entails the extraction of revenues through political exclusion and illegal means.
NATIONALIST AND ELITE EDUCATION: The strategy of
using skill and merit to perpetuate the rule of a political elite fosters the
other necessary component of the developmental state, to wit, the centrality of
education. Not only does the strategy advocate the expansion of education so as
to increase human resources in all areas of social life, but also insists on
providing a quality education, especially an elite education at the higher
level of university. The provision of highly trained people is a component part
of the policy of rapid economic growth and hence of direct interest to the
ruling elite.
Needless to say, education is also geared toward
nation-building: in conjunction with the values of meritocracy, it promotes
national consciousness and unity. Obviously, the promotion of nationalism is
necessary to justify the prerogatives of a strong state and inculcate
discipline, just as it is necessary to galvanize and mobilize people around the
national goal of development. Without the inculcation of the values of loyalty,
unity, dutifulness, meritocracy, and the drive to learn, the developmental
state cannot achieve the mobilizing power it needs to lead the country into the
road of rapid development.
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THE ETHIOPIAN SITUATION
In thus exposing the main characteristics of the
developmental state, we secure the ability to see whether Ethiopia under Meles
has the required attributes for a successful move. It must be admitted that,
once again, we find a repeat of the mistake of Ethiopia’s previous modernizing
regimes, namely, the attempt to copy a model of development and apply it in a
country lacking the necessary prerequisites.
Most observers acknowledge that market economy in
Ethiopia not only operates under unfriendly conditions, but has also taken a
skewed form. For instance, despite the primacy given to improving agricultural
production, the entire agricultural activity is hampered by the state’s control
of land. The absence of private ownership of land does not allow peasants to use
their allotted land for transaction purposes. Nor does it encourage them to
invest so as to improve productivity. The state’s ownership of land and its
subsequent disincentive effect on agricultural production represent a major
disparity with East Asian countries that is not likely to be removed any time
soon. State ownership of land is necessary to keep control over the peasantry
and protect the ethnic boundaries. If land becomes a commodity that peasants
can sell and buy at will, the confinement of people to ethnically defined areas
would be seriously jeopardized.
The ethnic borders add further restrictions on
economic activity in that they prevent the free mobility of labor and capital.
People isolated behind ethnic borders and increasingly turned into alien groups
by a denationalized education, the nurture of animosity over past treatments,
and a separatist language policy, are understandably little inclined to move
from region to region in search of opportunity. The hampering effect of
internal borders is no less true for capital owners: their ethnicity can
restrict their freedom to invest wherever they like or can cost them heavy
losses in the form of bribes to local agents to get the necessary permission.
Another major distortion to market economy is the
fact that the Ethiopian economy is increasingly dominated by conglomerates that
have close ethnic and political ties with those controlling state power.
Directly owned and managed by senior members of the TPLF, the conglomerates
extend their activities in numerous and crucial agricultural and industrial
productions as well as in service areas, such as banking, insurance, import/
export, etc. There is no denying that the provision of political support to
these TPLF-controlled businesses structurally distorts the operation of free
market. The distortion encourages the wide practice of corruption and
embezzlement, given that enterprises owned by businessmen non-ethnically
related to the ruling elite cannot hope to operate without bribing officials of
the regime.
The weight of political intervention undermines
efficiency and quality in all spheres of business and bureaucratic activities.
Not only does political protection foster the wide practice of corruption, but
it also erases free competition, the result of which is that merit and the
norms of efficiency and quality are set aside. Likewise, it creates insecurity
since the lack of the rule of law, basically manifested by the complete
subordination of the judicial system to the ruling elite as well as by the
ethnically charged social atmosphere, gives property rights a precarious
status, to say the least. Insecurity, wide corruption, and the absence of free
competition, all conspire to discourage investment and block the improvement of
productivity. In short, the characteristics of the Ethiopian economy are at the
antipode of what is needed to launch a process of development that could be
branded as an application of the Asian model of development.
Another crucial disparity is that the cumbersome
weight of political intervention does not allow the autonomy of the
bureaucratic sphere which, as we saw, is a defining feature of the Asian model
of development. Far from allowing autonomy, Meles and his cronies are using the
bureaucracy as an extended organ of the political machinery, thereby
undermining impartiality and professionalism, and distributing favorable
treatments on the basis of political patronage, ethnic affiliation, and bribes.
What must be emphasized here is that the ethnic basis of the Ethiopian state,
as fashioned by the TPLF, is structurally adamant to the autonomy of the
bureaucracy. In order to build a competent and professional bureaucracy,
recruitment and promotion must be based on merit rather than on ethnic
affiliation and political patronage. The whole ideology and political goal of
Meles and his followers are thus directly opposed to the establishment of a
professional bureaucracy.
One necessary condition for creating a competent
bureaucracy and improving the human capital in terms of skills, knowledge, and
expertise is, of course, education. In this regard, the records of the Meles
regime show some improvement, but alas an improvement that is only
quantitative. We can even say that the quantitative improvement is obtained to
the detriment of quality. The tense relationship of the regime with students
and teachers further weighs on the regime’s inability to raise the standard of
education. Also, the lack of political accommodation and material improvement
cause a systematic brain drain that further impoverishes the country of skilled
people. If the regime cannot find incentives by which it retains the services
of the people it educates, then it can never attain the level of human capital
needed to launch a developmental state.
Another obstacle disabling the educational policy
is the lack of nationalist themes extolling Ethiopia. Civic education is
polarizing in that it is not directed toward national integration and the
development of national consciousness; rather, it exalts ethnic identity and
fragmentation. It reiterates past grudges, but does little to create a new
national consciousness based on the inheritance of the past. Whatever
nationalism the educational system or the regime is propagating, it is an
exhortation to a clean slate, start-from-zero nationalism. This futuristic
nationalism answers every question except the most important one, which is: Why
an Oromo person, for instance, would prefer the construction of a new Ethiopia
to the creation of an independent Oromia? The futuristic nationalism lacks the
excitement and commitment flowing from continuity, from the sense of belonging
to a historical and transcendental community. The future generates excitement
when it connects with the past so that it tells a story, a saga by assuming the
mission of looking after and moving forward a legacy.
Interestingly, Meles knows that the developmental
state needs a nationalist theme, that popular mobilization around national
goals is one of its strengths. That is why he is now fanning the theme of “war
on poverty” and the Abay dam project. Especially, the latter project is highly
nationalist: (1) it enables Meles to blame Western countries for their
reluctance to support the project; (2) it revives a longstanding grudge against
Egypt over the control of the Nile; (3) it appeals to the contribution of each
Ethiopian, thereby supplying a common national goal, regardless of ethnic
belonging, and allegedly able to pull Ethiopia out of poverty.
In his address during the 20th anniversary of the
victory of the TPLF, Meles made a short speech about the Abay dam project that
was saturated with nationalist slogans and boastings. The themes of unity,
common goal, and eradication of poverty promised the renaissance of Ethiopia,
the restoration of the eminent place it had in the past. Not once was the
ethnic issue mentioned, rather, the historical identity of Ethiopia was back to
the forefront.
One would be tempted to shout “Alleluia” were it
not for the fact that this tardy nationalist discourse does not agree with the
actual ideology, political structure, and economic policy of the regime. This
brings us back to the fundamental issue, to wit, the question of knowing
whether the Ethiopian ruling elite has the characteristics of a
development-oriented elite, as forcefully required by the theory of the
developmental state. As we saw, the non-predatory character of the ruling elite
is the sine qua non of the whole theory: in addition to being nationalist, the
ruling elite must draw its legitimacy and its retention of state power from its
ability to deliver economic growth rather than through the use of repression.
To the question of whether Meles and his cronies
are anywhere close to being a developmental elite, the answer is, of course,
no. This negative answer does not, however, mean that they are unable to become
developmental. I am not saying that some such transformation will occur or that
it is inevitable. As a strong skeptic of determinism in history, I am simply
referring to the possibility inherent in the human person to finally make the
right choice and laying some conditions necessary to effect the transformation.
Since my position will certainly cause an array of objections, even angry
attacks, it is necessary that I set out the arguments liable to back it up.
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CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL
ELITES
Serious studies on the rise of developmental states
agree that threat to power is the reason why authoritarian elites decide to
initiate reforms promoting economic growth. The reforms are meant, not to
satisfy any sudden democratic aspiration, but essentially to preserve power.
The threat can be internal or external or both; the point is that it is clearly
perceived that the ruling elite will soon lose everything unless it initiates
reforms. Such was the case with Japan, which adopted drastic reforms toward
modernization in order to counter the threat of colonization. Such countries as
Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and South Korea undertook reforms to weaken the
menace of communism. If we take the case of some Latin American countries, we
find that their modernization is a response to the danger of internal
insurrections led by Marxist groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution. In the
face of serious threats, ruling elites adopt either a repressive policy as the
right response or opt for reforms as the best way to ensure their long-term
interests. History testifies that, of the two methods, the avenue of reform has
best served ruling elites.
Additionally, the wise policy of reforms is
perceived as a way of getting out of the political stalemate caused by
authoritarian regimes. When traditional elites engage in the process of
modernization, they initiate the formation of a modernizing elite, especially
through Western education, whose interests and outlooks clash with the
traditional system of power legitimacy. This conflict is easily translated into
a competition for the control of political power. Authoritarianism is then used
as a repressive power to maintain rising elites in a subordinate position. All
the same, the assessment of the ruling elite could also be that a policy of
repression brings about neither economic development nor ensures peace and
political stability. The expectation of an indefinite and inconclusive political
conflict creates a rapprochement between the authoritarian elite and aspiring
modernizing elites. Stated otherwise, both parties realize the existence of a
political stalemate and take the decision to engage in negotiations. The
decision means the renunciation of repression on the part of the ruling elite
and the withdrawal of the call for the overthrow of the regime on the part of
aspiring elites. These decisions show their respective readiness to compromise
on reforms to the system.
My contention is that the Ethiopian situation
precisely exhibits a political stalemate, itself fraught with dangerous
possibilities. The tangible repressive tendency of the regime after the 2005
election has forced opposition forces and leaders to opt either for an armed
conflict, with all the uncertainties that are attached to this form of
struggle, or pursue a peaceful struggle whose success depends on Meles’s
guarantee of democratic rights, which, I believe, is no longer likely. The
third possibility is the path of popular uprising of the kind shaking up the
Arab world. The likelihood of a popular uprising in Ethiopia cannot be
underestimated even if no one can tell when and how it is going to materialize.
One thing is sure, though: unless something is done, it will occur and, given
the political structure established by the TPLF, it is not set to be peaceful
and probably will invite dangerous confrontations. What is likely is not the
Egyptian situation of the army refusing to shoot demonstrators, but the Libyan
or Syrian scenario of bloody confrontation and civil war.
Redoubtable though Meles’s repressive power may be,
he is not likely to marginalize the opposition and achieve a final victory. The
fact that the state becomes a repressive power blocks the economic progress
that he needs to sideline the opposition. On the other side, the challenge of
the opposition is bound to grow but without endangering Meles’s hold on power,
that is, so long as it sticks to a peaceful form of struggle. This stalemate
can implant nothing else but the seeds of an angry popular insurrection that no
one can seriously claim to control. In other words, the present situation is
deepening the political stalemate, which can only develop into a dangerous
state of affairs for everybody unless a mood for compromise soon emanates from
all parties concerned….
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(Ed’s note. For reasons of space (page limit), only
some sections of the full article has been taken, that is, the parts dealing
with characteristics of “development state” and the analysis of Ethiopian
situation based on that characteristics of development state. The article was
partly reproduced from abugida.info website, June 13th, 2011)
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